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ABSTRACT 
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) as 
strongly favoring the enforcement of arbitration agreements. An issue 
that the Supreme Court has not yet addressed—and on which state and 
federal courts are split—is the enforceability of employment arbitration 
agreements signed by minors. This Article argues that arbitration 
agreements in minors’ employment contracts should be voidable, with 
three exceptions: when (1) the arbitration agreement (or container 
employment agreement) is signed by the minor’s guardian on the minor’s 
behalf, (2) the minor is emancipated, or (3) the minor is suing to enforce 
the employment contract. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Susie has just been hired at the local diner. She is sixteen years old. Every 
weekend, Susie wakes up and goes to the diner to serve breakfast. Unfortunately, 
one of the cooks begins making overtly sexual comments to Susie. Eventually, he 
begins touching her inappropriately. Susie mentions this conduct to the manager, 
but the manager fires her for being a “trouble-maker.” Her attorney files a 
complaint in court, and the diner’s attorney files a motion to compel arbitration 
because Susie had signed an arbitration agreement in her employment contract 
with the diner. Susie’s attorney replies to the court that Susie is a minor and that 
minors’ contracts are voidable. The court is now faced with the question of 
whether an arbitration agreement contained within an employment contract can 
be enforced against a minor. 
The enforcement of arbitration agreements is favored by the Supreme Court 
of the United States1 regardless if the underlying claim is contractual or a 
statutory discrimination claim.2 Courts have generally not enforced arbitration 
agreements against minors.3 However, courts addressing arbitration agreements 
 
1. See KPMG LLP v. Cocchi, 132 S. Ct. 23, 26 (2011) (citing Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 
U.S. 213, 217 (1985)) (holding that when a complaint contains both arbitrable and nonarbitrable claims, the 
FAA requires courts to compel arbitration of pendent arbitrable claims when a party files a motion to compel, 
even where the result would be an inefficient resolution of a dispute involving separate forums); see also Perry 
v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489 (1987) (stating that there is a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration 
agreements); Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 474 (1989) 
(stating that the FAA was designed to overrule the judiciary’s history of refusing to enforce arbitrate 
agreements). 
2. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991) (holding that an arbitration 
was an appropriate forum to litigate a claim of age discrimination); see also AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011) (holding that an arbitration agreement may cut off a claimant’s right 
to create a class action and that “States cannot require a procedure that is inconsistent with the FAA, even if it is 
desirable for unrelated reasons”). 
3. H & S Homes, L.L.C. v. McDonald, 823 So. 2d 627, 630 (Ala. 2001) (“[I]nfancy is a valid defense to 
the enforcement of a properly supported motion to compel arbitration of disputes arising out of a contract.”); see 
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within minors’ employment contracts have been inconsistent. One federal district 
court and one state court have compelled arbitration agreements included in 
minors’ employment contracts.4 One federal district court and one state court 
have refused to compel minors’ arbitration agreements in employment contracts.5 
This Article argues that, with certain exceptions, arbitration agreements 
should be enforced against a minor only if that minor’s parent has signed the 
agreement on the minor’s behalf. Part II of this Article discusses the development 
of arbitration enforceability. Part III briefly explains minors’ place in contract 
law. Part IV discusses the cases on-point relating to arbitration agreements 
contained within the employment contracts of minors. Part V analyzes the cases 
on point and proposes a solution for the courts.  
II. BRIEF DISCUSSION OF THE ENFORCEABILITY OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS 
A. The Federal Arbitration Act 
At common law, courts were hostile to arbitration agreements.6 Either party 
could revoke an arbitration agreement so long as the arbitrator had not yet issued 
an award.7 However, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), which was “enacted in 
1925 and re-codified in 1947, however, required courts to enforce arbitration 
agreements related to commerce and maritime transactions.”8 Up to the mid-
1950s, arbitration clauses were found in commercial contracts where commercial 
parties specifically sought them.9 However, the Supreme Court radically widened 
this narrow reach of arbitration in the following decades.10 
The Supreme Court has held that the legislative history of the FAA 
establishes that it was created to ensure “judicial enforcement of privately made 
agreements to arbitrate.”11 Furthermore, the FAA only mandates the arbitration of 
 
also Wilkie ex rel. Wilkie v. Hoke, 609 F. Supp. 241, 242 (W.D.N.C. 1985) (holding that an arbitration 
agreement is voidable by a minor). 
4. Sheller ex rel. Sheller v. Frank’s Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 150 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Douglass 
v. Pflueger Haw., Inc., 135 P.3d 129, 138 (Haw. 2006) (“[T]he infancy doctrine . . . is not applicable in the 
employment context.”).  
5. Stroupes v. Finish Line, Inc., No. 1:04-cv-133, 2005 WL 5610231 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 16, 2005); In re 
Mexican Rests., Inc., Nos. 11-04-00154-CV, 11-04-00155-CV, 2004 WL 2850151 (Tex. Ct. App. Dec. 2, 
2004).  
6. Richard A. Bales, Contract Formation Issues in Employment Arbitration, 44 BRANDEIS L.J. 415, 418 
(2006) [hereinafter Bales, Contract Formation Issues]. 
7. Richard A. Bales, The Laissez-Faire Arbitration Market and the Need for a Uniform Federal 
Standard Governing Employment and Consumer Arbitration, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 583, 588 (2004). 
8. Id. 
9. Drew M. Gulley, Note, The Enhanced Arbitration Appeal Amendment: A Proposal to Save American 
Jurisprudence from Arbitration, Modeled on the English Arbitration Act of 1996, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1095, 
1100 (2008). 
10. Id. 
11. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985). 
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claims upon the motion of a party to a “privately negotiated arbitration 
agreement[].”12 The Court has looked to the House Report accompanying the 
FAA as clarifying “that its purpose was to place an arbitration agreement ‘upon 
the same footing as other contracts, where it belongs, and to overrule the 
judiciary’s longstanding refusal to enforce’” arbitration agreements.13 
The FAA Section 2 savings clause provides that arbitration agreements “shall 
be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or 
in equity for the revocation of any contract.”14 The Supreme Court has taken this 
to mean that when a court decides “whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a 
certain matter, courts generally . . . should apply ordinary state-law principles 
that govern the formation of contracts.”15 The Court has also expanded the FAA 
to apply to statutory claims16 and has held that the FAA preempts state laws 
targeting arbitration agreements.17 
B.  Supreme Court’s Favor of Arbitration Agreements 
In Wilko v. Swan, the Supreme Court held that the Securities Act voids 
stipulations that prospectively waive “judicial trial and review.”18 Consequently, 
the lower federal courts “interpreted Wilko as creating a ‘public policy’ defense 
to the enforcement of arbitration agreements . . . when statutory claims were at 
issue.”19 
Title VII, enacted in 1964, prohibits employment discrimination on the basis 
of “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”20 Subsequently, other federal 
statutes extended legal protection to include age,21 pregnancy,22 and disability.23 
State legislatures also began to pass similar statutes.24 This explosion in 
employment rights founded in federal statutory law was followed by a steep 
increase in employment claims.25 
Consequently, whether or not these statutory rights could be arbitrated was 
soon at issue. In 1974, the Supreme Court in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. 
 
12. Id. 
13. Id. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., at 1 (1924)). 
14. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) (emphasis added); see also Bales, Contract Formation Issues, supra note 6, at 
418 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2). 
15. First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995). 
16. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991). 
17. Bales, Contract Formation Issues, supra note 6, at 422. 
18. 346 U.S. 427, 437, 438 (1953); see also Bales, Contract Formation Issues, supra note 6, at 418. 
19. Bales, Contract Formation Issues, supra note 6, at 419. 
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006).  
21. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–34 (2006). 
22. Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). 
23. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–13. 
24. Bales, Contract Formation Issues, supra note 6, at 419. 
25. Id. 
03_BALES_MILLER-NOVAK_VER01_7-12-12_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/29/2013 9:55 AM 
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 44 
343 
held that an employee did not waive his statutory discrimination claim by first 
submitting to arbitration pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement.26 
Subsequently, however, in the Mitsubishi Trilogy, the Court overruled Wilko and 
enforced arbitration agreements concerning antitrust, securities, and racketeering 
statutory claims.27 The Court reasoned that “we are well past the time when 
judicial suspicion of the desirability of arbitration and of the competence of 
arbitral tribunals inhibited the development of arbitration as an alternative means 
of dispute resolution.”28 
Thereafter, in a landmark decision, the Court held that arbitration agreements 
would be binding upon statutory claims.29 In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane 
Corp., the Court required a non-union employee to arbitrate rather than litigate an 
age discrimination claim due to a pre-dispute arbitration agreement that he signed 
as a condition of his employment.30 The Court reasoned that an agreement to 
arbitrate a statutory claim is not to surrender a right to a claim, but it is an 
agreement to resolve the claim in a venue other than the courts.31 
In general, the Court has stated that the reading of an arbitration agreement 
should be liberal and favor its enforcement.32 This makes any agreement to 
arbitrate binding on the parties despite state policies contrary to enforcement.33 
Although the intentions of contracting parties remain important, their intentions 
are construed as to favor arbitrability.34 
C.  The FAA and Preemption 
In Southland v. Keating, a number of franchisees sued a franchisor claiming 
it had violated certain disclosure requirements of the California Franchise 
Investment Law.35 Despite the arbitration clause, the California Supreme Court 
held that the claims were not arbitrable.36 The California Supreme Court based its 
decision on a provision in the California Franchise Investment Law that declared 
 
26. 415 U.S. 36, 38, 60 (1974). 
27. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989); Shearson/Am. Express, 
Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 
614 (1985). 
28. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 626–27. See generally Bales, Contract Formation Issues, 
supra note 6, at 419–20 (discussing the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence concerning arbitration of statutory 
claims).  
29. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
30. Id. at 23–27. 
31. Id. at 26; see also Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 628 (stating that when a person agrees to 
arbitrate, they do not give up a substantive right, he only agrees to an arbital venue to state his claim). 
32. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). 
33. Id. 
34. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 626. 
35. 465 U.S. 1, 3–4 (1984). 
36. Id. at 5. 
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void “[a]ny condition, stipulation or provision purporting . . . to waive 
compliance with any provision of this law.”37 The California statute demanded 
judicial consideration of franchisor-franchisee disputes.38 Because the arbitration 
provision waived the right to a jury trial, the California Supreme Court held that 
the arbitration clause “was void under the anti[-]waiver provision.39 
The United States Supreme Court reversed the decision and held that the 
FAA applied in state court and it preempted the California statute’s anti-waiver 
provision.40 The Court concluded that in enacting Section 2 of the FAA, Congress 
declared a national policy favoring arbitration and intended to limit the power of 
the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims that the 
contracting parties had agreed to arbitrate.41 
Thereafter, in Perry v. Thomas, the Court held that the FAA preempted a 
California statute that enabled suits to collect wages regardless of the existence of 
any private agreement to arbitrate.42 In a footnote, the Court stated that general 
defenses to contracts, such as unconscionability, are available if the defenses are 
used to govern general issues concerning the validity, revocability, and 
enforceability of contracts.43 However, the Court stated that a court may not focus 
on an agreement to arbitrate in and of itself as a basis for holding that an 
agreement is unconscionable.44 
In Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, the Court again enforced an 
arbitration clause.45 The arbitration agreement, despite an Alabama law 
precluding the enforcement of such arbitration agreements, was contained within 
a home extermination contract.46 While summarizing the FAA Section 2 savings 
clause, the Court held that states may regulate contracts, including arbitration 
clauses, under general principles of contract, and states may invalidate an 
arbitration clause “upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
revocation of any contract.”47 However, states may not decide that a contract is 
fair enough to enforce while refusing to enforce an arbitration agreement 
 
37. Id. at 10 (quoting CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 31512 (West 1977)). 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. at 10–16. 
41. See id. See generally Bales, Contract Formation Issues, supra note 6, at 422. 
42. 482 U.S. 483, 491 (1987). 
43. Id. at 492 n.9; Bales, Contract Formation Issues, supra note 6, at 423 (citing Perry, 482 U.S. at 
492). 
44. Perry, 482 U.S. at 492 n.9; Bales, Contract Formation Issues, supra note 6, at 423 (citing Perry, 482 
U.S. at 492). 
45. 513 U.S. 265 (1995).  
46. Id.; Bales, Contract Formation Issues, supra note 6, at 423. 
47. Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 281 (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted); Bales, Contract 
Formation Issues, supra note 6, at 423. 
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contained within it.48 Any such state policy contradicts the FAA because such a 
policy would place arbitration clauses on an unequal footing.49 
In Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, the Supreme Court invalidated a 
Montana statute that required an arbitration clause to be “typed in underlined 
capital letters on the first page of the contract.”50 The Montana Supreme Court 
had held that the notice provision was consistent with the FAA and was 
consequentially not preempted.51 The Montana Court had concluded that the goal 
of the FAA was to promote arbitration that was knowingly agreed to by the 
parties; however, it was not the FAA’s goal to do so at any cost.52 The United 
States Supreme Court rejected this argument and held that any state judicial or 
legislative law that specifically targeted voiding arbitration agreements, rather 
than contracts in general, was preempted by the FAA, regardless of whether the 
purpose of the law was to promote the “knowing choice of arbitration.”53 
More recently, in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, the Court addressed 
whether a state court could order class-wide arbitration.54 Reasoning that the 
arbitration agreement at issue did not address a class-wide arbitration, the South 
Carolina Supreme Court ordered the arbitration.55 In a plurality opinion, the 
United States Supreme Court held that the arbitrator, instead of the state court, 
should decide whether an arbitration agreement permits class-wide arbitration.56 
However, three dissenters argued that the state court “imposed a regime that was 
contrary to the express agreement of the parties as to how the arbitrator would be 
chosen,” and that, therefore, the FAA preempted the order of class-wide 
arbitration.57 
In Preston v. Ferrer, the Court addressed the issue of whether the FAA 
preempted a state law requiring parties to have their claims decided by an 
administrative board.58 In Preston, an attorney who provided services for Ferrer 
(“Judge Alex”) in the television industry initiated an arbitration proceeding 
against Ferrer for claims relating to fees under their contract.59 The Court held 
that when parties agree to arbitrate all claims arising from a contract, the FAA 
 
48. Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 281; Bales, Contract Formation Issues, supra note 6, at 423. 
49. Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 281; Bales, Contract Formation Issues, supra note 6, at 423; see also 9 
U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006). 
50. 517 U.S. 681, 684, 688 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting MONT. CODE. ANN. § 27-
5-144 (4) (1993)); Bales, Contract Formation Issues, supra note 6, at 424. 
51. Doctor’s Assocs. Inc., 517 U.S. at 685. 
52. See id. at 684–85; Bales, Contract Formation Issues, supra note 6, at 424. 
53. Doctor’s Assocs. Inc., 517 U.S. at 688; Bales, Contract Formation Issues, supra note 6, at 424. 
54. 539 U.S. 444, 447 (2003). 
55. Id. at 450. 
56. Id. at 454. 
57. Id. at 459–60 (Rehnquist, C.J., and O’Connor & Kennedy, JJ., dissenting); see also Bales, Contract 
Formation Issues, supra note 6, at 424. 
58. 552 U.S. 346, 346–48 (2008). 
59. Id. 
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preempts state laws requiring another forum, “whether judicial or 
administrative.”60 
Recently, in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the Court expanded the 
FAA’s preemption to address a general California state policy against class-
action waivers in adhesion consumer contracts.61 This particular AT&T 
arbitration agreement provided that all consumer claims would be subject to 
arbitration and that class-wide arbitration would not be permitted, which was 
contrary to California law generally prohibiting class-action waivers in consumer 
adhesion contracts.62 The Court held that while the FAA allowed for general state 
contract laws that apply to any contract to invalidate an arbitration agreement, 
“nothing in [the FAA] suggests the intent to preserve [state contract laws] that 
stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA’s objectives.”63 Since the 
goal of arbitration is to provide a process more expedient than litigation, the 
Court held that a law refusing to recognize a class-action waiver is repugnant to 
the goals of the FAA.64 
Finally, in 2012, the Court established that a state public policy against the 
arbitration of wrongful death claims regarding nursing homes was preempted by 
the FAA.65 In Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown, three plaintiffs sued a 
nursing home for the death of a family member due to negligent conduct.66 The 
West Virginia Supreme Court invalidated the arbitration agreements contained 
on the entrance application due to a state policy against the arbitration of such 
claims.67 The United States Supreme Court vacated the ruling on grounds that the 
state policy specifically targeted an arbitration agreement and therefore was 
preempted by the FAA.68 
Thus, general state contract law may defeat the enforcement of an arbitration 
agreement.69 However, any state law specifically targeting the enforcement of an 
arbitration agreement will be preempted by the FAA.70 Furthermore, state policy 
that acts as an “obstacle” to the goals of the FAA may also be preempted by the 
FAA.71 
 
60. Id. at 359. 
61. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). See generally Ian D. Mitchell & Richard A. Bales, Concepcion and 
Preemption Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 2012 PENN. ST. Y.B. ON ARB. & MED. (forthcoming 2013) (on 
file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
62. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744. 
63. Id. at 1748. 
64. See id. at 1749. 
65. Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012). 
66. Id. at 1201–03. 
67. Id. at 1203. 
68. Id. at 1204. 
69. See, e.g., supra notes 45–49. 
70. See Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc., 132 S. Ct. at 1204. 
71. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011). 
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III. BACKGROUND OF MINORS’ OBLIGATIONS IN CONTRACT AND  
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS 
A.  The Infancy Doctrine and the Doctrine of Necessities 
Society has a natural inclination to want to protect its children, and the law of 
contracts is no exception. The infancy doctrine is designed to protect minors in 
their dealings with adults.72 Generally, minors do not have the capacity to enter 
into a valid contract, and contracts created by minors are considered voidable 
when the minor reaches the age of majority, as opposed to automatically void at 
the time the contract is formed.73 Minors are able to disaffirm their contracts 
during minority, majority, or within a reasonable time after emancipation, but 
minors may also ratify their contracts after reaching the age of majority.74 
Nevertheless, while a minor can disaffirm his or her own contract, a minor 
cannot disaffirm a contract made by a parent or guardian on his or her behalf. 75 
Contracts for necessities are an exception to the infancy doctrine.76 The term 
“necessities” refers to articles and services that are required for the minor’s well-
being.77 Classifying an article as a necessity depends on the “actual need” for that 
article by the minor, rather than just the nature of the article the minor contracted 
for.78 To determine if the minor has actual need for the article, the courts often 
look at the circumstances existing at the time the minor receives delivery of the 
article.79 This concept of actual need is directly addressed in some state statutes 
that require a minor to be emancipated for a contract to be deemed one of 
necessity.80 Furthermore, in multiple jurisdictions, courts will not hold a contract 
 
72. Michaelis v. Schori, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 380, 381 (Ct. App. 1993) (“It is the policy of the law to protect 
a minor against himself and his indiscretions and immaturity as well as against the machinations of other people 
and to discourage adults from contracting with an infant.”). 
73. See 1 DONALD T. KRAMER, Legal Rights of Children § 10:1 (Rev. 2d ed. West 2005). 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. § 10:2. 
77. Id. § 10:2 n.2. 
78. 42 AM. JUR. 2d Infants § 61. 
79. Id. 
80. CAL. FAM. CODE § 6712 (West 2004). 
A contract, otherwise valid, entered into during minority, may not be disaffirmed on that ground 
either during the actual minority of the person entering into the contract, or at any time thereafter, if 
all of the following requirements are satisfied: (a) The contract is to pay the reasonable value of 
things necessary for the support of the minor or the minor’s family. (b) These things have been 
actually furnished to the minor or to the minor’s family. (c) The contract is entered into by the minor 
when not under the care of a parent or guardian able to provide for the minor or the minor’s family. 
Id.; see also N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-10-12 (West 2004) (“A minor cannot disaffirm a contract, otherwise 
valid, to pay the reasonable value of things necessary for the minor’s support or that of the minor’s family, if 
such contract is entered into by the minor when not under the care of a parent, guardian, or conservator able to 
provide for such minor or the minor’s family.”). 
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to be one for necessities if the minor has a parent or guardian who is able to pay 
for them.81 Other situations, such as homelessness, may require courts to enforce 
minors’ contracts.82 Several states have created statutory rules demanding that 
emancipated minors’ contracts regarding certain transactions are to be enforced.83 
As an example, an Oregon statute makes a minor’s contract for an apartment 
enforceable if the minor is over sixteen years old.84 The purpose of this statute is 
to combat the problem of homeless minors.85 Absent the assurance this Oregon 
statute provides, a landlord would find a lease with a minor undesirable because 
the lease would work only one way: the lease would be binding on the landlord, 
but it would not be binding on the minor. The purpose of this legislation is to 
encourage landlords to lease to minors by assuring landlords that the contracts 
will be enforceable.86 As another example of such legislation, Texas allows a 
minor to remove his or her “disabilities” to contract if he or she is emancipated 
under its code.87 
B.  Arbitration Agreements and Minors 
Like contracts in general, a minor may typically void arbitration 
agreements.88 However, contracts entered into by a legal guardian on behalf of a 
minor can be enforceable against the minor,89 and several courts have followed 
this principle by allowing parents to bind their minor children into arbitration 
agreements for medical treatment.90 Thus, minors who normally would not have 
the capacity to contract, and who normally are protected from waivers of their 
 
81. See, e.g., Young v. Weaver, 883 So. 2d 234, 238–40 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003). 
82. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 109.697 (2011). 
83. See, e.g., id.; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 31.001(a) (West 2008). 
84. OR. REV. STAT. § 109.697.  
85. Id. (“[T]he Legislative Assembly finds that there are in the State of Oregon unemancipated minors 
who are living apart from their parents and are homeless. Many of these minors are able financially to provide 
housing and utility services for themselves and their children, but cannot contract for these necessities due to 
perceived legal limitations affecting contracts with minors. The purpose of this legislation is to address those 
limitations.”). 
86. Id. 
87. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 31.001(a) (“A minor may petition to have the disabilities of minority 
removed for limited or general purposes if the minor is: a resident of the state; 17 years of age, or at least 16 
years of age and living separate and apart from the minor’s guardian; and self-supporting and managing the 
minor’s own financial affairs.”). 
88. Wilkie ex rel. Wilkie v. Hoke, 609 F. Supp. 241, 242 (W.D.N.C. 1985) (“Under common law, 
plaintiff, as a minor, can elect to void the agreement to arbitrate controversies.”); see also H & S Homes, L.L.C. 
v. McDonald, 823 So. 2d 627, 630 (Ala. 2001) (“[I]nfancy is a valid defense to the enforcement of a properly 
supported motion to compel arbitration of disputes arising out of a contract.”). 
89. Latham v. Wedeking, 412 N.W.2d 225, 227 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987); see also Doyle v. Giuliucci, 401 
P.2d 1, 3 (Cal. 1965); George K. Walker, Family Law Arbitration: Legislation and Trends, 21 J. AM. ACAD. 
MATRIMONIAL LAW. 521, 625 (2008) (“South Dakota legislation allows natural parents with custody of a minor 
child to enter into a binding arbitration agreement on behalf of the child for medical services.”). 
90. See, e.g., Doyle, 401 P.2d at 3.  
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rights by a parent, may still be bound to the terms of a contract for medical 
necessities.91 Public policy compels this rule; otherwise, minors would regularly 
disaffirm medical-care contracts and “medical groups would be disinclined to 
extend such protection to minors.”92 Any contract that medical groups enter into 
regarding the treatment of minors would work only one way: the treating medical 
group would be subject to any liabilities resulting from the treatment, but the 
minor would not be bound to his or her obligations contained within the contract. 
A California appellate court extended a parent’s ability to bind a minor child 
to an arbitration agreement beyond the parent’s living children to children that 
will be born to the parent in the future.93 If a parent seeks medical treatment and 
agrees to arbitrate any claims resulting from the treatment, the parent’s children 
would also need to arbitrate any claim resulting from the treatment of the parent. 
This principle applies to all claims that could arise out of the medical treatment.94 
Consequently, if a parent’s child were to bring a wrongful death action due to a 
mishap of her parent’s treatment, the action would be bound by the parent’s 
agreement to arbitrate the claim, regardless of whether the child was born or 
unborn at the time the parent signed the agreement.95 However, the action is not 
bound by the parent’s agreement to arbitrate the claim if the child is no longer a 
minor.96 
A parent’s ability to bind a minor to arbitration can be considered “implicit in 
the parent’s right and duty to care for the child.”97 The strong impact of a parent’s 
review of a contract is the assurance that somebody the law recognizes as able to 
enter into binding agreements is representing a vulnerable minor.98 When 
deciding whether to enforce a minor’s arbitration agreement regarding medical 
treatment, the courts and state legislatures have balanced the pressing concerns of 
protecting minors and the doctors’ concern for medical malpractice costs.99 
However, courts are split on whether to enforce an arbitration agreement 
against a minor when the arbitration clause is contained within an employment 
contract. Two courts have held that arbitration agreements in employment 
 
91. MN MedInvest Co. v. Estate of Nichols ex rel. Nichols, 908 So. 2d 1178, 1179 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2005). 
92. Allgor v. Travelers Ins. Co., 654 A.2d 1375, 1379 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995). 
93. See Bolanos v. Khalatian, 283 Cal. Rptr. 209, 212 (Ct. App. 1991) (“We see no logic in not applying 
this subdivision for medical services to a minor who at the time was unborn.”). 
94. Id. 
95. Id. 
96. Buckner v. Tamarin, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 489, 492 (Ct. App. 2002). 
97. Jennie K. Ferguson, Can Arbitration Play a Saving Role in Women’s Health? The Use of Arbitration 
in the OB/GYN Specialty, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1005, 1026 (2006). 
98. Id. 
99. Crown ex rel. Comfort v. Shafadeh, 403 N.W.2d 465, 466 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that 
because the state legislature had an important interest in enforcing arbitration agreements regarding medical 
malpractice, compelling a minor to arbitrate when parents signed was not in violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause). 
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contracts should be enforced against minors.100 Two other courts have refused to 
enforce arbitration agreements against a minor regardless of the agreement’s 
position within an employment contract.101 
IV. ENFORCEABILITY OF AN ARBITRATION AGREEMENT IN A MINOR’S 
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT 
This Article will now discuss the four decisions that have directly addressed 
whether an arbitration agreement contained within a minor’s employment 
contract should be enforceable against the minor. This Part will first discuss the 
cases that determined that the arbitration agreement was enforceable against the 
minor. This Part will then discuss the cases where the arbitration agreement was 
held not to be enforceable. 
A.  Courts Enforcing Arbitration Agreements Against Minors  
In Sheller ex rel. Sheller v. Frank’s Nursery & Crafts, Inc., the Northern 
District Court of Illinois refused to allow minors to disaffirm their agreement to 
arbitrate claims arising from their employment.102 The defendant, Frank’s Nursery 
& Crafts, Inc., employed plaintiffs Rebecca Bennett and Kimberly Sheller before 
firing them when the two girls were both minors.103 
Rebecca and Kimberley’s signed employment application provided:  
[A]ny claim that I may wish to file against the Company . . . must be 
submitted for binding and final arbitration before the American 
Arbitration Association; arbitration will be the exclusive remedy for any 
and all claims unless prohibited by applicable law. * * * I have reviewed, 
understand and agree to the above.104 
 After their termination, Rebecca and Kimberly filed a sexual discrimination 
claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the 
Illinois Department of Human Rights.105 The EEOC then issued a right-to-sue 
letter, which allowed the girls to proceed in court rather than through the 
Commission.106 
 
100. See Douglass v. Pflueger Haw., Inc., 135 P.3d 129, 145 (Haw. 2006); see also Sheller ex rel. 
Sheller v. Frank’s Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 150, 154 (N.D. Ill. 1997); see also infra Part IV.A. 
101. In re Mexican Rests., Nos. 11-04-00154-CV, 11-04-00155-CV, 2004 WL 2850151, at *2 (Tex. Ct. 
App. Dec. 2, 2004); see also Stroupes v. Finish Line, Inc., No. 1:00-cv-133, 2005 WL 5610231, at *6 (E.D. 
Tenn. Mar. 16, 2005); see also infra Part IV.B. 
102. 957 F. Supp. at 153. 
103. Id. at 152. 
104. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (omissions in original). 
105. Id. 
106. Id. 
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Rebecca and Kimberly subsequently sued in federal court, claiming sexual 
harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.107 Rebecca and Kimberly 
alleged that “they were subjected to a constant hostile work environment due to 
the sexual harassment by Defendant’s assistant manager” during the course of 
their employment.108 In its opinion, the court addressed whether the plaintiffs’ 
status as minors rendered the arbitration clause voidable.109 
The parties agreed that state law determines whether a contractual arbitration 
clause is binding as to a minor.110 The court acknowledged that under the infancy 
doctrine, with an exception for necessities, a minor’s contract is “voidable and 
may be repudiated by the minor during minority or within a reasonable time upon 
achieving majority absent a ratification.”111 The court stated that “[t]he infancy 
law doctrine exists to protect the inexperienced minor from the consequences of 
dealing with” more experienced adults.112 The court also stated that the minor’s 
right to repudiate existed despite the potential for harm to the other contracting 
party.113 However, the court stated that a minor could use the infancy doctrine 
only as a “shield” and never as a “sword.”114 
The court reasoned that permitting Rebecca and Kimberly to void their 
contract would be “inconsistent with the public policy reasons underlying the 
infancy law doctrine.”115 Even though the court recognized that the rationale 
behind the infancy doctrine is to protect the inexperienced minors in their 
dealings with others, the court stated that Rebecca and Kimberly’s status as 
minors was “irrelevant to their signing of the employment application agreeing to 
arbitrate all claims against the company.”116 The court noted that Frank’s Nursery 
also required its adult employees to sign the same contract.117 Because Rebecca 
and Kimberly would not have been employed or have been able to bring the suit 
unless they signed the arbitration agreement, the court found that the two minors 
 
107. Id. (bringing suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e). 
108. Id. 
109. Id. at 153. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Iverson v. Scholl, Inc., 483 N.E.2d 893, 897 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1985)). 
112. Id. (citing Old Mutual Casualty Co. v. Clark, 368 N.E.2d 702, 705 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977)); see also 
Iverson, 483 N.E.2d at 897. 
113. Sheller, 957 F. Supp. at 153 (citing Iverson, 483 N.E.2d at 897). 
114. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Shepherd v. Shepherd, 97 N.E.2d 273, 282 (Ill. 
1951)) (arguing that “a minor’s right to [disaffirm upon coming of age, like the right to] disaffirm in any other 
case, should be exercised with some regard to the rights of others, certainly with as much regard to those rights 
as is fairly consistent with adequate protection of the rights of the minor himself”). 
115. Id. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. at 154. 
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would retain an advantage from a transaction they had repudiated.118 The court 
concluded that Illinois law would not permit such a thing to occur.119 
Similarly, in Douglass v. Pflueger Hawaii, Inc., the Supreme Court of 
Hawai’i followed in Sheller’s footsteps and enforced against a minor an 
arbitration agreement within an employment contract.120 The defendant, Pflueger 
Acura, hired the plaintiff, Adrian Douglass, as a lot technician at its car lot in 
Honolulu, Hawai’i.121 Adrian was less than four months shy of his eighteenth 
birthday at the time Pflueger hired him.122 Adrian attended an employee 
orientation and was issued “Pflueger’s Employee Handbook.”123 The Employee 
Handbook contained “policies and procedures regarding Pflueger’s anti-
harassment/discrimination policies and an arbitration provision.”124 The provision 
provided that “[a]ny and all claims arising out of the employee’s employment 
with the Company and his/her termination shall be settled by final binding 
arbitration in Honolulu, Hawai’i, in accordance with the arbitration provisions of 
the Federal Arbitration Act and the rules and protocol prevailing with the 
American Arbitration Association.”125 
After receiving the Employee Handbook, Adrian “was injured on the job 
when a coworker sprayed him in the buttocks with an air hose.”126 Subsequently, 
Adrian complained of the conduct to the Hawai’i Civil Rights Commission 
(HCRC).127 The HCRC issued Adrian a right-to-sue letter in response to his 
election to pursue the matter in court rather than through the Commission.128 
Thereafter, Adrian sued Pflueger in the circuit court.129 The complaint asserted 
that the air-hose assault constituted a hostile work environment, sexual assault 
and discrimination, and negligent training and supervision.130 
The Supreme Court of Hawai’i began by discussing the infancy doctrine and 
the general ability of minors to disaffirm their contracts.131 The court continued 
by discussing the doctrine of necessities and the limited circumstances that 




120. 135 P.3d 129 (Haw. 2006). 










131. Id. at 134–35. 
132. Id. at 135. 
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legislature’s decision to carve out two exceptions to the infancy doctrine.133 First, 
the legislature decided to bind minors to their contracts for medical treatment.134 
Second, the legislature decided that contracts entered into for treatment of 
alcohol and drug abuse would be binding upon minors.135 
The court focused on the decision of the state legislature to no longer require 
certain work certificates once required of sixteen and seventeen year olds.136 The 
court stated that “the legislature clearly viewed minors in this particular age 
group—being only one to two years from adulthood—as capable and competent 
to contract for gainful employment and, therefore, should be bound by the terms 
of such contracts.”137 The court also stated that such a contract for a minor under 
the age of sixteen signed by a parent on behalf of the minor would also be 
binding.138 Finally, the court held that the general rule that allows a minor to 
disaffirm his or her contracts does not apply in the employment context.139 
Therefore, the court concluded that an arbitration agreement within a minor’s 
employment contract is enforceable in Hawai’i.140 
Despite this holding, the court did not force Adrian to arbitrate.141 Pflueger 
gave Adrian the arbitration agreement within an employee handbook, and the 
court decided that Adrian was not put on proper notice of the arbitration 
agreement therein.142 Furthermore, the employee handbook was subject to change 
at any time by Pflueger and was consequently held by the court to provide 
illusory consideration.143 Even though the arbitration could have been enforced 
against Adrian, in the end he was not compelled to arbitrate because of consent 
and consideration issues.144 
B.  Courts Not Enforcing Arbitration Agreements Against Minors 
Just as two courts have held that arbitration agreements are enforceable 
against minors, two courts also have held that such agreements are not 





136. Id. at 136–38. 
137. Id. at 138. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. 
140. Id.  
141. See id. at 139–45. 
142. Id. For a general discussion of notice issues arising in employment arbitration agreements, see 
Bales, Contract Formation Issues, supra note 6, at 434–58. 
143. Douglass, 135 P.3d at 139–45. For a general discussion of the enforceability of arbitration 
agreements with unilateral-modification provisions, see Richard A. Bales & Michael L. DeMichele, Unilateral-
Modification Provisions in Employment Arbitration Agreements, 24 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 63 (2006). 
144. Douglass, 135 P.3d at 139–45. 
03_BALES_MILLER-NOVAK_VER01_7-12-12_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/29/2013 9:55 AM 
2013 / Minor Problem with Arbitration 
354 
to enforce an arbitration agreement within an employment contract against two 
minor girls because the two girls were not emancipated.145 “Elizabeth Kamali and 
Tab Kamali, as next friend of Priscilla Kamali, filed suit against Mexican 
Restaurants, Inc. . . . , Diamond Vinson, and Jerry McCord alleging sexual 
harassment, assault and battery, . . . as well as other tort and statutory claims.”146 
As part of their employment agreements, Elizabeth and Priscilla each signed an 
arbitration agreement with the restaurant.147 The arbitration agreement stated “that 
the Federal Arbitration Act shall apply to all disputes arising under the 
agreement.”148 When they signed their arbitration agreements, Elizabeth was 
seventeen and Priscilla was fifteen.149 After the claim was filed, the trial court 
refused to compel arbitration because the arbitration agreement was voidable.150 
Disagreeing with the decision of the trial court, the restaurant filed for mandamus 
to order the district court to compel arbitration.151 
On appeal, the restaurant took the position that the two girls were 
emancipated; they paid for their own apartment and helped support their 
parents.152 Furthermore, the restaurant argued that one of the girls was the sole 
provider to her own dependent son.153 
The appellate court stated that emancipation under Texas law required “an 
agreement by the parent to relinquish his parental rights to control the minor and 
to the minor’s services and earnings.”154 Although the two girls lived apart from 
their father, the court recognized that the girls still turned their checks over to 
him and received an allowance.155 Although the girls were able to support 
themselves and help support their father, the father still exercised control over the 
girls’ earnings; therefore, the court held that Elizabeth and Priscilla were not 
emancipated.156 Consequently, because Texas law dictates that a minor’s contract 
is voidable unless the child is emancipated,157 the court held that the arbitration 
agreement was not enforceable.158 
Similarly, in Stroupes v. Finish Line, Inc., the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Tennessee refused to enforce an arbitration agreement 
 
145. Nos. 11-04-00154-CV, 11094099155-CV, 2004 WL 2850151, at *2 (Tex. Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2004). 





151. See id.  
152. Id. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. (citing Pioneer Casualty Co. v. Bush, 457 S.W.2d 165, 168 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970)). 
155. Id. at *2. 
156. Id. 
157. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 31.001 (West 2008). 
158. In re Mexican Rests., Inc., 2004 WL 2850151, at *2. 
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within a minor’s employment contract.159 Lindsey Stroupes was sixteen years old 
and a sophomore in high school.160 Lindsey was hired by Finish Line and 
Anthony Bradley as a sales associate.161 In connection with her new position, 
Lindsey signed an employment agreement.162 The employment agreement 
required that “all claims against Finish Line be submitted to binding arbitration, 
as detailed in Finish Line’s ‘Employee Dispute Resolution Plan.’”163 Lindsey 
subsequently alleged that Anthony Bradley sexually harassed her, “by requesting 
intimacies, by pursuing, and touching, and attempting to touch her body; by 
kissing her and embracing her, by telephoning her at home, and by stating that he 
desired to take her away,” and “do other things to her.”164 
Lindsey sued Finish Line for sexual harassment, battery, and outrageous 
conduct.165 Lindsey asserted that her employment contract was voidable pursuant 
to the infancy doctrine because she was sixteen years old when she began 
working at Finish Line.166 Finish Line responded that the infancy doctrine should 
not apply to a minor’s employment contracts, and supported this assertion by 
citing Sheller,167 discussed above in Part III.A, and Dodson v. Shrader.168 The 
court quickly distinguished Dodson because it involved a minor’s purchase of 
goods, but it spent considerable time distinguishing Sheller.169 
Although the court agreed with Sheller that the infancy doctrine should be 
“used as a shield and not a sword,” the court did not agree that a minor is using 
the doctrine as a sword when the only issue addressed by the minor’s use of the 
infancy doctrine is the appropriate forum to adjudicate a claim.170 Moreover, the 
court did not agree with Sheller that a claimant’s status as a minor is “irrelevant” 
if all employees, including adults, signed the same agreement.171 The court was 
concerned that if it enforced the agreement against the minor because an adult 
had also signed the agreement, this reasoning could easily be extended from the 
 
159. No. 1:00-cv-133, 2005 WL 5610231, at *6 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 16, 2005). 
160. Id. at *2. 
161. Id. at *2–3. 
162. Id. at *3. 
163. Id. 
164. Id. at *17. 
165. Id. at *15. 
166. Id. at *5–6. 
167. Id. at *6; Sheller ex rel. Sheller v. Frank’s Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 150 (N.D. Ill. 
1997). 
168. 824 S.W.2d 545, 549 (Tenn. 1992) (holding that when a contract is a fair and reasonable one, and 
the minor has actually paid money and has used the article purchased, the minor could not recover the amount 
paid without allowing the vendor reasonable compensation for the use of, depreciation, and willful or negligent 
damage to the article purchased). 
169. Stroupes, 2005 WL 5610231, at *6–8. 
170. Id. *9 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Shepherd v. Shepherd, 97 N.E.2d 273, 282 (Ill. 
1951)). 
171. Id. at *10. 
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employment context to the consumer context.172 Thus, contracts signed by minors 
to purchase an automobile would not be voidable “because adults are also bound 
by the same agreement.”173 The court stated that if such things were true, the 
infancy doctrine “would cease to exist.”174 
Furthermore, the court understood Sheller as holding that a minor cannot 
both disaffirm a contract and sue on the contract.175 However, the court countered 
this reasoning by stating that although “a minor suing an employer for sexual 
harassment could not maintain the suit but for the employment, which requires 
signing the employment contract,” this fact does not create the result that a 
statutory claim for sexual harassment against an employer is actually a claim 
based on the employment contract itself.176 The court consequently concluded that 
employment contracts and the arbitration agreements contained within are 
voidable by a minor.177 
V. ANALYSIS OF CASES AND PROPOSAL 
Courts are split on whether to enforce against a minor an arbitration 
agreement contained in the minor’s employment contract. As seen above, some 
jurisdictions view the container-employment contracts as a necessity that cannot 
be disaffirmed by the minor. Other jurisdictions have made no distinction 
between the employment contract and any other contract that the minor enters; 
these jurisdictions allow minors to disaffirm the arbitration agreements contained 
within the employment contracts. This Article now will analyze the arguments on 
each side of the issue. 
A.  Reasons for Enforcing Arbitration Agreements Within Minors’ Employment 
Contracts 
Although courts are reluctant to bind minors to their agreements, there are 
several circumstances in which courts may want to enforce arbitration 
agreements within employment contracts against minors. First, if a minor is still 
employed with the employer when he or she brings an action, the minor is able to 
retain the benefits of the contract without returning the favor. Sheller referred to 
this as the minor being able to utilize the contract as both a sword and a shield.178 
 
172. Id. 
173. Id. at *10–11. 
174. Id. at *11.  
175. Id. at *12. 
176. Id. 
177. Id. at *13–14; see also H & S Homes, L.L.C. v. McDonald, 823 So. 2d 627, 630 (Ala. 2001) 
(holding that infancy is a valid defense to the motion to compel arbitration). 
178. See Sheller ex rel. Sheller v. Frank’s Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 150, 153–54 (N.D. Ill. 
1997). 
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However, in Sheller, the minors no longer were working for the nursery at 
the time they filed their claims.179 The court stated that a minor’s right to bring a 
lawsuit is a retained benefit of the employment contract.180 This reasoning is 
incorrect for two reasons. First, a formal employment contract is not a necessity 
for the right to bring a lawsuit and does not empower an employee with the right 
to sue. Discrimination claims are statutory; tort claims are common-law; neither 
arise from an employment contract. Consequently, legal claims are not a benefit 
of the contract. Second, in Sheller, the plaintiffs brought a lawsuit to address 
harms they suffered.181 Harassment is not a benefit to an employment contract; an 
employee contracts to be paid, not to be harassed. Therefore, the harassment of 
an employee is a harm caused by another employee of the employer independent 
of the contract. 
Nevertheless, if the minor were still employed, non-enforcement of the 
arbitration clause within the employment contract would allow the minor to 
retain benefits of the contract that he or she is attempting to disaffirm. For 
example, if a minor who signs a contract to purchase a car could terminate the 
contract at any time and only have to return the car, no car dealer would sell a car 
while aware of such a possible outcome. Therefore, if a minor files a claim while 
still employed and retaining the benefits of the employment contract, it is 
sensible to consider enforcing the arbitration agreement. By doing so, the minor 
would not be able to use the contract as both a sword and a shield.182 
The second circumstance in which courts may want to enforce minors’ 
arbitration agreements within employment contracts is if a minor is emancipated. 
Employment is a necessity for an emancipated minor. As discussed in Part III, a 
contract for necessities is a contract necessary to sustaining life, given a minor’s 
circumstances.183 If a minor is emancipated from his or her parents, employment 
is not just a source of money to go to the movies with his or her friends; 
employment is a means to support him or herself. 
As discussed above in Part III, the Oregon State Legislature drafted a statute 
to ensure the availability of housing for minors in need.184 California passed a law 
prohibiting minors from disaffirming medical contracts on the reasoning that “the 
public interest in encouraging pregnant minors to seek and doctors to provide 
medical care related to pregnancy outweighed the public policy designed to 
protect minors from their own improvidence.”185 A California appellate court also 
reasoned that if minors seeking pregnancy-related care were not able to enter into 
binding arbitration agreements, certain “physicians and medical groups will 
 
179. Id. at 152. 
180. Id. at 153. 
181. Id. at 152. 
182. See id. at 153. 
183. See KRAMER, supra note 73. 
184. OR. REV. STAT. § 109.697 (2011). 
185. Michaelis v. Schori, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 380, 381 (Ct. App. 1993). 
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refuse to render medical services unless a parent or guardian signs.”186 Such a 
minor may forgo acquiring the proper care because she may be fearful to enlist 
the presence of her guardian.187 If the above exceptions have been carved out of 
the infancy doctrine to ensure that minors have housing and medical treatment 
available, it may be sensible to require arbitration agreements within employment 
contracts to be enforced against emancipated minors to ensure they have access 
to available employment. 
The third circumstance in which courts may want to enforce minors’ 
arbitration agreements within employment contracts is where a minor seeking 
employment also is seeking out the responsibilities of adult life. In Douglass, the 
Supreme Court of Hawai’i reasoned that a minor who is only one to two years 
from adulthood was viewed by the legislature as being “capable and competent to 
contract for gainful employment.”188 Therefore, the court held that “a minor so 
close to adulthood” should be bound by the terms of such contracts.189 
Furthermore, the possibility of the minor’s parent(s) or guardian(s) being aware 
of the minor’s employment is high. If the guardian(s) have permitted and 
encouraged the minor to seek out employment and take on such adult 
responsibilities, the guardian could also be charged with taking a proactive role 
in educating the minor in his or her employment affairs rather than waiting for 
post-employment disputes to ensue. 
B.  Reasons for Not Enforcing Arbitration Agreements Within Minors’ 
Employment Contracts 
Although there are sensible reasons for enforcing a minor’s employment 
arbitration agreement, there are also valid reasons why enforcing such arbitration 
agreements may be repugnant to the infancy doctrine. First, an arbitration 
agreement, whether or not it is contained within an employment contract, is a 
waiver of a judicial forum and a complex notion for a minor to understand. As 
stated in Part III, arbitration agreements are generally unenforceable against 
minors.190 Although minors are approaching adulthood at the age of sixteen, they 
are still not adults. Furthermore, a minor who contracts for employment does so 
as a fresh inductee of the world of the employed. He or she has no extensive 
resume and has little experience dealing with managers or binding agreements. 
Although a minor may be able to understand some of the more simplistic 
obligations of an employment contract, some of the more complex clauses, 
 
186. Id. at 382 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting defendants). 
187. Id.  
188. Douglass v. Pflueger Haw., Inc., 135 P.3d 129, 138 (Haw. 2006). 
189. Id. 
190. See H & S Homes, L.L.C. v. McDonald, 823 So. 2d 627, 630 (Ala. 2001). 
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including the waiver of a judicial forum, are likely beyond the capacity of most 
minors. 
Second, unless a minor is emancipated from his or her parents, the 
circumstances will rarely exist that would establish his or her employment as a 
necessity. Although some courts have enforced arbitration agreements against 
minors in the medical and drug treatment context, the minors involved in those 
agreements had needs greater than the employment needs of unemancipated 
minors.191 
Third, enforcing an arbitration agreement with no additional safeguard to 
protect the minor undermines the infancy doctrine. The Sheller court enforced the 
arbitration agreement against the minor because the adults working at Frank’s 
Nursery also had to sign the same agreement.192 However, as the Stroupes court 
correctly stated, this reasoning in Sheller is inapposite to the entire basis of the 
infancy doctrine.193 The purpose of the infancy doctrine is to protect 
inexperienced minors in their transactions with adults.194 Furthermore, although 
employment can be a necessity for a minor, it depends on the minor’s 
circumstances.195 
Nevertheless, minors could be provided protection by the signature of a 
parent or guardian. Sheller and Stroupes dealt with the issue of whether to 
enforce an arbitration agreement within a minor’s employment contract.196 
However, when a parent signs a medical contract containing an arbitration 
agreement, the arbitration agreement is enforceable.197 Being able to bind one’s 
child to arbitration may “be considered implicit in the parent’s right and duty to 
care for the child.”198 A parent’s review of a document provides assurance that 
somebody the law recognizes as able to enter binding agreements is acting as a 
buffer for the vulnerable minor.199 In the medical treatment context, courts have 
enforced arbitration agreements on the ground that a parent has reviewed them.200 
Employment is no more important than medical care, and employers would 
hardly be burdened any further by requiring minor employees to have their 
contract cosigned by a parent. Therefore, if arbitration agreements are to be 
enforced against minors in the employment context, the safeguard of a parental 
signature is a useful and simple requirement.  
 
191. See, e.g., Douglass, 135 P.3d 129. 
192. Sheller ex rel. Sheller v. Frank’s Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 150, 153–54 (N.D. Ill. 1997). 
193. Stroupes v. Finish Line, Inc., No. 1:00-cv-133, 2005 WL 5610231, at *10 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 16, 
2005). 
194. See Sheller, 957 F. Supp. at 153. 
195. See KRAMER, supra note 73 (discussing necessity). 
196. See supra Part IV. 
197. See, e.g., Doyle v. Giuliucci, 401 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1965). 
198. Ferguson, supra note 97.  
199. Id. at 1027–28. 
200. See, e.g., Doyle, 401 P.2d at 3.  
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C.  Proposal for Enforcing Arbitration Agreements in Minors’ Employment 
Contracts  
This Article will now apply the reasons that the above four cases have 
illustrated for the enforcement or non-enforcement of arbitration agreements in 
minors’ employment contracts to propose a solution to the issue.201 The following 
proposal seeks to balance the need to protect the vulnerable minor and the 
integrity of the infancy doctrine against the interests of the emancipated minor 
and the employer. The following four points will address this purpose. 
First, arbitration agreements in a minor’s employment contract should 
generally be unenforceable. The infancy doctrine exists to protect minors from 
such difficult navigations in their dealings with others.202 Furthermore, unless the 
minor is emancipated or finds him or herself in another similar circumstance, the 
employment is unlikely to justifiably qualify as a necessity.203 
Second, when an arbitration agreement with a minor has been reviewed and 
signed by a parent, it should be binding against the minor. Because the minor’s 
parent reviewed the agreement on behalf of the minor, the minor has been 
adequately protected. The parental signature requirement should appropriately 
balance the need to protect the minor in his dealings with adults and the need for 
employers to have confidence in the agreement they entered into with the minor 
employee. In addition, it would be of little inconvenience to an employer to 
merely require a signature from the parent of the unemancipated minor. 
Third, if the minor is still employed and receiving the benefits of the 
contract, the arbitration agreement should be enforced as to any contractual 
claims. The right to sue may not be a right that is owed to the contract.204 As an 
example, sexual harassment is a statutory right, and it is not an action born out of 
the agreement, such as a dispute over vacation time. If a minor brings such a 
discrimination suit after employment, a minor would no longer be enjoying the 
benefits of the employment agreement. However, if a minor is still employed and 
brings a contract-based claim, he or she would still be enjoying the benefits of 
the contract. By allowing a minor to disregard the contained arbitration 
agreement, a court may be allowing a minor to use the contract as both a sword 
and a shield.205 Therefore, any such contractual claims by a minor who is still 
employed should be brought pursuant to the existing arbitration agreement. 
 
201. Douglass v. Pflueger Haw., Inc., 135 P.3d 129 (Haw. 2006); Sheller ex rel. Sheller v. Frank’s 
Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 150 (N.D. Ill. 1997); In re Mexican Rests., Inc., Nos. 11-04-00154-CV, 
11-04-00155-CV, 2004 WL 2850151 (Tex. Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2004); Stroupes v. Finish Line, Inc., No. 1:00-cv-
133, 2005 WL 5610231 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 16, 2005). 
202. Michaelis v. Schori, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 380, 381 (Ct. App. 1993) (“It is the policy of the law to 
protect a minor against himself and his indiscretions and immaturity as well as against the machinations of other 
people and to discourage adults from contracting with an infant.”). 
203. See, e.g., In re Mexican Rests., 2004 WL 2850151, at *1. 
204. Stroupes, 2005 WL 5610231, at *4. 
205. See Sheller, 957 F. Supp. at 153–54.  
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Finally, the arbitration agreement should be enforceable against a minor who 
is emancipated from the legal protection of his guardian or parent. This is 
especially important because if a parental signature were to be required to 
enforce the agreement to arbitrate, the minor who has no parental representation 
may be unemployable. Furthermore, it is this type of minor who likely has the 
greatest need for employment and who, as a result of his or her emancipation, 
likely has the most experience entering into contracts. Therefore, to ensure that 
the emancipated minor can find work and that the employer’s interest for the 
enforceability of his agreement is protected, there should be an exception to 
requiring a parental signature for the emancipated minor. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In Susie’s case of being harassed by the cook at the local diner,206 whether 
she will be compelled to arbitrate her sexual harassment claim will depend on her 
jurisdiction. First, the court will discuss the Supreme Court’s view favoring the 
enforcement of arbitration clauses. The court then will look to her status as a 
minor and the relevant law regarding necessities in the jurisdiction. The court 
may look to the local legislative view of emancipated minors and determine 
whether Susie qualifies as an emancipated minor. Finally, the court may create a 
bright-line rule determining whether minors are bound to the terms of their 
employment contracts and either enforce or refuse to enforce the arbitration 
agreement on that determination alone. 
However, rather than a ruling determined by a jurisdictional view of 
employment contracts and minors, courts should examine the arbitration 
agreement in the same manner as courts view any contract entered into by a 
minor. The courts should focus on the circumstances of the minor and other 
safeguards in place to protect the minor from his inexperience in contracting. By 
refocusing in this manner, courts can more effectively balance the minor’s 
inexperience with the minor’s ability to use the infancy doctrine as both a sword 
and a shield.207 First, arbitration agreements in minors’ employment contracts 
should generally be seen as voidable. Second, as in the case in many decisions 
regarding medical treatment agreements, courts should make an exception for 
arbitration agreements containing the signature of the minor’s guardian on his or 
her behalf. Third, the arbitration agreement should be enforced if the minor is 
still employed while bringing a contract-based suit. Finally, the arbitration 
agreement should be enforced if the minor is emancipated. In summary, a minor 
who is not still employed during a contract-based suit, emancipated, or does not 
have the protection of guardian review of the contract should not be bound by an 
arbitration agreement contained within an employment contract. 
 
206. See supra Part I. 
207. See Sheller, 957 F. Supp. at 153–54. 
